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 OPINION OF THE COURT 
 __________ 
 
MANSMANN,  Circuit Judge. 
 This class action arises out of the termination of 
post-retirement medical benefit plans, sponsored by Unisys for 
retirees and disabled former employees of Unisys and its 
corporate predecessors, Sperry Corporation and Burroughs 
Corporation.  The retirees seek to recover post-retirement 
medical benefits under the terms of their welfare benefit plans 
and under the Employee Retirement Income Security Act's 
("ERISA's") provisions for appropriate equitable relief.   
  
 We are asked to decide in this particular appeal1 
whether the district court erred in holding, on this breach of 
contract claim, that summary plan descriptions that used the 
terms "lifetime" or "for life" to describe the duration of 
medical benefits, while at the same time reserving the employer's 
right to modify or terminate at "any time" and "for any reason" 
the plans under which these benefits are provided, were 
unambiguous.  We also address whether the district court erred in 
refusing to reinstate the retirees' estoppel claims upon which 
                     
1
.   This appeal concerns some of the claims of the Sperry 
regular retirees, and the claims of a sub-group of Sperry early 
retirees.   
 
 The appeals docketed at Nos. 94-1801, 94-1875, 94-1912 
and 94-2216 concern the claims of the Unisys and Burroughs 
retirees, as well as the remaining claims of the Sperry retirees.  
In appeal No. 94-1801, the Unisys early retirees have appealed 
from an adverse judgment rendered after trial on their claims for 
breach of contract, breach of fiduciary duty and estoppel.  The 
claims of the Burroughs early retirees and many of the claims of 
the Sperry early retirees were settled pursuant to a partial 
settlement agreement between Unisys and these retirees.  In 
appeal No. 94-1875, Unisys has appealed from an order of the 
district court reinstating the Sperry retirees' claims for breach 
of fiduciary duty.  In appeal No. 94-1912, the Burroughs and 
Unisys regular retirees have appealed from the district court's 
grant of summary judgment in favor of Unisys on their breach of 
contract and estoppel claims.  In appeal No. 94-2166, a sub-group 
of Sperry retirees attempted to challenge the partial settlement 
between Unisys and the Sperry and Burroughs early retirees which 
did not include them.   
 
 On October 3, 1994 we granted the parties' joint motion 
to consolidate appeal Nos. 94-1800, 94-1801, 94-1875 and 94-1912 
for purposes of filing a single joint appendix and for 
disposition.  All of these appeals have now been resolved, either 
by our decisions in published opinions see Nos. 94-1800 and 94-
1875, or by memorandum opinions rendered in Nos. 94-1801, 94-1912 
and 94-2216. 
  
Unisys had earlier been granted summary judgment.  We will affirm 
the judgment of the district court. 
 
 I. 
 In September of 1986, Sperry Corporation and Burroughs 
Corporation merged to form Unisys Corporation.  Prior to the 
merger, Sperry consisted of a number of business units or 
divisions.  Until 1984 each Sperry division maintained its own 
medical benefits program, with each described in a separate 
summary plan description.  In 1984, in an attempt to streamline 
the medical benefits plans and in response to rising medical 
costs, Sperry implemented Medflex, a corporate-wide medical 
benefits plan that applied to the entire Sperry Corporation.2  
Medflex was applied to future retirees only; existing retirees 
continued to receive coverage under the pre-Medflex plans which 
applied when they retired. 
 Following the merger in 1986, Unisys continued the 
Medflex plan for active employees and for those who retired after 
its implementation but prior to April 2, 1989.  Unisys also 
continued all of the pre-Medflex plans for those who retired 
prior to Medflex's implementation.3  In 1989, Unisys effected the 
                     
2
.   Medflex applied to all Sperry business units by January 
1, 1984, with the exception of one sub-group of the Sperry 
Division, which commenced participation in Medflex on January 1, 
1985. 
3
.   Following the merger, Unisys maintained all of the 
separate medical benefit plans for its retirees -- approximately 
75 plans, a situation described by one Unisys executive as a 
"royal administrative headache."  This abundance of plans was due 
primarily to Sperry's corporate structure which consisted of 
  
consolidation of its retiree medical benefit plans when it 
created the Unisys Post-Retirement and Extended Disability 
Medical Plan to cover all employees who retired after April 1, 
1989, most of whom were former Sperry and Burroughs employees.    
 On November 3, 1992, Unisys publicly announced that 
effective January 1, 1993, it was terminating all existing 
medical benefit plans and replacing all of the pre-existing 
medical plans with the new Unisys Post-Retirement and Extended 
Medical Disability Plan.  Under the new plan, retirees would be 
responsible for increasing levels of contributions until January 
1, 1995, when they would have to pay the full cost of their 
premiums.  Thus, the new plan sharply contrasted with earlier 
plans, under the majority of which Unisys paid the entire premium 
for an individual's life and provided benefits for the 
individual's spouse as well.4   
(..continued) 
several business units or divisions, with each division having 
its own medical plan.  Further, the district court found that 
even in a single Sperry division, several plans often existed due 
to the company's practice of maintaining the plan under which an 
individual retired and implementing new plans prospectively only. 
4
.   Unisys' decision to terminate the benefit plans under 
which it had provided coverage and to replace those plans with 
the new Unisys Post Retirement and Extended Disability Medical 
Plan was challenged in nine separate actions which the Judicial 
Panel on Multidistrict Litigation transferred to the Eastern 
District of Pennsylvania and consolidated for disposition 
pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1407.  On June 9, 1993, after determining 
that Unisys "acted on grounds generally applicable to the class," 
the district court certified the case as a class action pursuant 
to Fed. R. Civ. P.23(b)(2).  The class consists of approximately 
21,000 former non-union employees of Sperry, Burroughs and 
Unisys.  The court certified three distinct classes:  Unisys 
retirees, Sperry retirees or Burroughs retirees.  The claims of 
each class were adjudicated separately.   
 
  
 The appellees in this case are former employees of 
Sperry Corporation (and their eligible dependents) who retired 
between 1969 and April 1, 1989, from Sperry Corporation or 
Unisys, Sperry's successor.  Following Unisys' termination of 
their post-retirement medical benefit plans in late 1992, the 
retirees sought relief based on three theories:  breach of 
contract, equitable estoppel, and breach of fiduciary duty.  The 
Sperry retirees argued that Unisys' termination of their 
respective medical plans violated ERISA.  They argued first that 
Unisys had denied them "vested" benefits in violation of 29 
U.S.C. § 1132(a)(1)(B) because the summary plan descriptions 
("SPDs") explaining their medical benefits contained the term 
"lifetime" benefits.  Regarding their contract claims, the 
retirees relied on the explicit lifetime language in the plans, 
e.g., "when you retire, your medical benefit will be continued 
for the rest of your life", and on statements made by the company 
both orally and in writing to the same effect.5   
(..continued) 
 The retirees asserted two sets of claims:  general 
claims on behalf of all retirees, and separate claims on behalf 
of "early" retirees who retired under various early retirement 
incentive programs offered by the company throughout the 1980s.  
Many of the claims of the early retirees were settled after 
trial, but not the claims of a subgroup of Sperry early retirees 
denominated as VRIFs, who are part of this appeal.  See also 
appeal No. 94-2166.   
5
.   A subgroup of Sperry retirees who retired pursuant to a 
voluntary reduction in force asserted a separate contract claim 
of their own that the company had induced them to retire earlier 
than they would have done by representing that if they retired, 
they would preserve the post-retirement coverage in effect under 
then current plans.  These "VRIF" retirees argued that they 
accepted Unisys' "offer" by retiring early, thus forming separate 
bilateral contracts.   
  
 The Medflex SPD is illustrative.  A Sperry employee who 
retired during the period January 1, 1984 through April 1, 1989 
received medical benefits under this plan.  The SPD for Medflex 
is set forth in a booklet titled, "Your Company and You."  
Included in this plan was the following description of retiree 
medical benefit coverage: 
 If you're eligible, Medical Plan benefits 
continue without cost after you terminate 
active employment.  Benefits also may 
continue on a contributory basis for your 
eligible dependents who are covered when your 
employment terminated. . . .  Coverage 
continues for you for life and for your 
dependents while they remain eligible 
provided you don't stop the contributions for 
their coverage.  After your death, your 
eligible dependents may continue coverage by 
making the require contributions.  Their 
coverage continues until your spouse dies or 
remarries. 
 
(A 2227) (emphasis added).   
 The retirees argued alternatively, that even if the 
court were to find that "lifetime" is not synonymous with 
"vested", the evidence established that Unisys intended that a 
reservation of rights clause in the plan, enabling the company to 
change the plan at will, only applied to active employees and not 
to retirees; thus, the company never intended to reserve its 
right to terminate the plans as far as retirees are concerned.  
In addition, the retirees contended that Unisys breached its 
fiduciary duty by systematically misrepresenting the plans and 
  
should be equitably estopped from exercising any right to 
terminate their benefits.6 
   Unisys responded that it had indeed reserved the right 
to terminate the retirees' medical plans due to the "reservation 
of rights clauses" or "RORs" located in other sections of the 
plans.  Typical of these clauses is the one set forth in the SPD 
describing the Medflex plan.  The Medflex SPD booklet, "Your 
Company and You," was distributed to all employees and contained 
the following reservation of rights clause: 
 Plan Continuation 
 
 The Company expects to continue the Plans, 
but reserves the right to change or end them 
at any time.  The Company's decision to 
change or end the Plan may be due to changes 
in federal or state laws governing welfare or 
retirement benefits, the requirements of the 
IRS or ERISA, the provisions of a contract or 
policy involving an insurance company or any 
other reason . . . . 
 
(A 2750) (emphasis added).   
 In addition to the provisions set forth in the summary 
plan descriptions, information about retiree medical benefits was 
also conveyed to the Sperry retirees through various informal 
oral and written communications.  As in the summary plan 
descriptions, the duration of medical benefits was described as 
being "for life" or for the "lifetime" of the retiree and spouse.  
                     
6
.   The Sperry retirees' breach of fiduciary claim is not 
implicated in this appeal.  It is the subject of the appeal 
docketed at 94-1875. 
  
Sperry did not include in these informal communications a 
reference to the reservation of rights clause.   
 Notwithstanding these communications, Unisys denied 
having created vested medical benefits through its use of the 
words "lifetime" or "for life", and early in the litigation filed 
a motion for summary judgment seeking dismissal of all of the 
regular retirees' claims based on the unambiguous reservation of 
rights clauses in the plans.  Although the district court granted 
Unisys' motion on the retirees' breach of fiduciary duty and 
estoppel claims, it denied summary judgment on the retirees' 
contract or plan-based claim.  The district court initially found 
that the internal inconsistency between the lifetime promises and 
the reservations of rights clauses made the plans ambiguous and 
thus a trial on the extrinsic evidence was necessary to resolve 
the ambiguity.  In re Unisys, 837 F. Supp. 670, 679 (E.D. Pa. 
1993).  After trial,7 the district court reversed its position on 
both the contract and breach of fiduciary duty claims, entering 
judgment against the Sperry regular and VRIF retirees on their 
contract claims but reinstating the Sperry retirees' breach of 
fiduciary claim.8 
                     
7
.   Although the retirees have also appealed from the 
district court's order striking their demand for a jury trial, we 
need not address this issue on appeal given our disposition of 
the contract ambiguity issue.   
8
.   On October 13, 1993, the district court granted summary 
judgment in favor of Unisys on the Sperry retirees' claim that 
Unisys had breached its fiduciary duty.  In re Unisys, 837 F. 
Supp. at 670, 679-80.  At trial, the Sperry retirees moved for 
reconsideration of their breach of fiduciary duty claim in light 
of our decision, rendered during trial, in Bixler v. Central Pa. 
Teamsters Health and Welfare Fund, in which we held that a direct 
  
 The district court had jurisdiction pursuant to 28 
U.S.C. § 1331 and 29 U.S.C. § 1132(e)(1).  We have jurisdiction 
pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1291.   
 
 II. 
 A. 
 ERISA is a comprehensive statute enacted "to promote 
the interests of employees and their beneficiaries in employee 
benefit plans," Shaw v. Delta Airlines, Inc., 463 U.S. 85, 90 
(1983), and "to protect contractually defined benefits," 
Massachusetts Mutual Life Ins. v. Russell, 473 U.S. 134, 148  
(1985).  See also 29 U.S.C. § 1001.  ERISA recognizes two types 
of employee benefit plans:  pension plans and welfare plans.  
Deibler v. Local Union 23, 973 F.2d 206, 209 (3d Cir. 1992).  In 
general, welfare plans provide "medical, surgical or hospital 
care or benefits, or benefits in the event of sickness, accident, 
disability, death or unemployment . . . ."  29 U.S.C. § 1002(1).  
Pension plans provide:  (i) retirement income to employees or 
(ii) result in a deferral of income by employees for periods 
extending to the termination of covered employment or beyond.  29 
U.S.C. § 1002(2)(A).  Both Unisys and the retirees agree that the 
retiree medical benefit plans at issue in this case are welfare 
benefit plans under 29 U.S.C. § 1002(1).   
(..continued) 
action for breach of fiduciary duty is available under section 
1132(a)(3)(B).  12 F.3d 1292 (3d Cir. 1994).  Relying on Bixler, 
the district court granted this motion and reinstated the Sperry 
retirees' claims for breach of fiduciary duty. 
  
 The implications of this are significant.   Although 
ERISA contains elaborate vesting requirements for pension plans, 
ERISA does not require automatic vesting of welfare benefit 
plans.  Alexander v. Primerica Holdings, Inc., 967 F.2d 90, 95 
(3d Cir. 1992); Smith v. Hartford Ins. Co., 6 F.3d at 136 (3d 
Cir. 1994).  Congress did not impose vesting requirements on 
welfare plans because it determined that "[t]o require the 
vesting of those ancillary benefits would seriously complicate 
the administration and increase the cost of plans whose primary 
function is to provide retirement income."  Hozier v. Midwest 
Fasteners, Inc., 908 F.2d 1155, 1160 (3d Cir. 1990) (citing 
H.Rep. No. 807, 93rd Congr., 2d Sess. 60, reprinted in 1974 U.S. 
Code Cong. & Admin. News 4670, 4726).  In rejecting the automatic 
vesting of welfare plans, Congress evidenced its recognition of 
the need for flexibility with regard to an employer's right to 
change medical plans.  As the Court of Appeals for the Second 
Circuit observed: 
 Automatic vesting was rejected because the 
costs of such plans are subject to 
fluctuating and unpredictable variables.  
Actuarial decisions concerning fixed 
annuities are based on fairly stable data, 
and vesting is appropriate.  In contrast, 
medical insurance must take account of 
inflation, changes in medical practice and 
technology, and increases in the cost of 
treatment independent of inflation.  These 
unstable variables prevent accurate 
prediction of future needs and costs.   
 
Moore v. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co., 856 F.2d 488, 492 (2d Cir. 
1988).  See also 29 U.S.C. § 1051. 
  
 Nonetheless, in some situations, a welfare plan may 
provide a vested benefit.  Alexander, supra, 967 F.2d at 95; 
Schoonejongen v. Curtiss-Wright, 18 F.3d 1034, 1042 (3d Cir. 
1994), rev'd and remanded on other grounds, ___ U.S. ___, 115 S. 
Ct. 1223 (1995).  The plan participant bears the burden of 
proving, by a preponderance of the evidence, that the employer 
intended the welfare benefits to be vested.  Howe v. Varity 
Corp., 896 F.2d 1107 (8th Cir. 1990).  
 ERISA's framework ensures that employee benefit plans 
be governed by written documents and summary plans descriptions, 
which are the statutorily established means of informing 
participants and beneficiaries of the terms of their plan and its 
benefits.  See, e.g., Hozier v. Midwest Fasteners, Inc., supra; 
Confer v. Custom Engineering Co., 952 F.2d 41 (3d Cir. 1991); 
Hamilton v. Air Jamaica, Ltd., 945 F.2d 74 (3d Cir. 1991), cert. 
denied, 112 S. Ct. 1479 (1992); 29 U.S.C. § 1022(a)(1).  
Accordingly, any retiree's right to lifetime medical benefits 
under a plan can only be found if it is established by the terms 
of the ERISA-governed employee benefit plan.   
 A court must examine the plan documents.  Boyer v. 
Douglas Components Corp., 986 F.2d 999 (6th Cir. 1993).  Extra-
ERISA commitments, such as the right to receive free lifetime 
coverage, must be found in the plan documents and stated in clear 
and express language.  Wise v. El Paso Natural Gas, 986 F.2d 929 
(5th Cir.), cert. denied, 114 S. Ct. 196 (1993).  See also Alday 
v. Container Corp. of America, 906 F.2d 660, 665 (11th Cir. 1990) 
("[A]ny retiree's right to lifetime medical benefits at a 
  
particular cost can only be found if it is established under the 
terms of the Erisa-governed benefit plan document"), cert. 
denied, 498 U.S. 1026 (1991).  The written terms of the plan 
documents control and cannot be modified or superseded by the 
employer's oral undertakings.  See Hozier v. Midwest Fasteners, 
Inc., 908 F.2d at 1163 (citing Musto v. American General Corp., 
861 F.2d 897, 910 (6th Cir. 1988), cert. denied, 490 U.S. 1020 
(1989) (the unambiguous written provisions of a plan must 
control, and extrinsic evidence may not be introduced to vary the 
express terms of a plan)) and Gordon v. Barnes Pumps Inc., 999 
F.2d 133, 137 (6th Cir. 1993) (a basic principle of ERISA is that 
a plan may not be modified or superseded by oral statements or 
other extrinsic evidence). 
 To determine whether Sperry intended to confer vested 
benefits upon its retirees in this case, we must analyze the 
provisions of the retiree medical benefit plans at issue.  Unisys 
and the Sperry retirees agree that the Sperry summary plan 
descriptions are the controlling documents that we must 
interpret.  The threshold issue in this case, whether the Sperry 
plans were ambiguous, is a question of law.  Taylor v. 
Continental Group, 933 F.2d 1227, 1232 (3d Cir. 1991).  We turn 
now to the exact language of the plans in question and apply 
these principles of law. 
 
 B. 
 Although Sperry maintained many different medical 
benefit plans for its separate divisions or business groups, all 
  
of these plans conveyed the same message:  that post-retirement 
medical benefits would be provided for life.  There were slight 
variations in the exact language utilized to convey this message.  
For instance, the Sperry Univac plan contained the following 
language: 
 When you retire . . . the comprehensive 
medical expense benefits then in force for 
you and your eligible dependents under this 
plan will be continued for the rest of your 
life. 
 
SPD for Sperry Univac (A 2232).  Another plan provided: ". . . 
coverage continues for you for life and for your dependents while 
they remain eligible . . . ."  Sperry Medflex SPD (A 2749). 
 Unisys offered the same defense for all Sperry 
divisions, namely that this lifetime language was subject to 
reservation of rights clauses located elsewhere in the plans. 
Although some reservation of rights clauses were more detailed 
than others, each clause provided that the company could 
terminate the plan "at any time" and "for any . . . reason."  See 
Sperry Medflex Plan, A 2750.  Based on these provisions, the 
retirees asserted that the retiree medical benefit plans were 
ambiguous and that the ambiguity arose not merely from the 
reservation of rights clauses themselves, but also from the 
inconsistency between the reservation of rights clauses and the 
plan's lifetime promises.  According to the retirees, the plans 
were ambiguous because they were susceptible to either of two 
interpretations:  the retirees' interpretation that the lifetime 
language limited the scope of the reservations of rights, or the 
  
company's interpretation that the reservation of rights limited 
the lifetime language.  If the court finds "but one reasonable 
interpretation, then a fortiori there can be no ambiguity."   
Curcio v. John Hancock Life Ins. Co., 33 F.3d 226, 231 (3d Cir. 
1994).  However, if the language is susceptible to more than one 
reasonable interpretation, then it will be found to be ambiguous.  
Id.9   
 In Schoonejongen v. Curtiss-Wright, supra, we reviewed 
summary plan descriptions which stated in varying forms that 
health insurance benefits would terminate "upon death" or when 
"you cease to be a member of a class eligible for insurance . . . 
[or] upon discontinuance of the group policy."  18 F.2d at 1036-
37.  Some years later, Curtiss-Wright amended the language in its 
summary plan description to provide that "[c]overage under this 
plan will cease for retirees and their dependents upon the 
termination of business operations of the facility from which 
they retired."  Id. at 1037.  The affected retirees argued that 
this reservation on its face referred only to employees and not 
to retirees.  Because the reservation did not unambiguously 
reserve the right to terminate retiree benefits, the district 
court held a trial to resolve the ambiguity.  18 F.3d at 1041.  
                     
9
.   Although the district court originally agreed, at the 
summary judgment stage, that the presence of lifetime language 
and the reservation of the right to end the plans at any time 
made the plans "internally inconsistent," and therefore, 
ambiguous, it subsequently reversed this position in light of our 
decision in Curtiss-Wright, 18 F.2d at 1042, which the court 
interpreted as suggesting that "there is nothing inconsistent 
about having lifetime language and a ROR in the same documents."  
  
Based on the extrinsic evidence, the district court found that 
the clause did apply to retirees.  We affirmed the district 
court's holding that Curtiss-Wright had reserved the right to 
terminate retiree benefits, but held that Curtiss-Wright lacked a 
formal amendment procedure in violation of section 402(b)(3) of 
ERISA, 29 U.S.C. § 1102(b)(3), and therefore the amendment to the 
plan was invalid.  We responded to the retirees' argument that 
the plan's description of the duration of benefits as ceasing 
"upon death" created vested benefits:   
 It seems to us, however that our conclusion 
[that Curtiss-Wright had a reserved right to 
amend] is a complete answer to this argument.  
Even if the plan contained unambiguous 
assurances that all retirees would have 
health insurance benefits for so long as 
Curtiss-Wright maintained a post-retirement 
health insurance program, the general 
reserved right to amend the terms of the plan 
in whole or in part would render the right of 
any retiree or group of retirees terminable 
by the adoption of a legally effective 
amendment.   
 
Curtiss-Wright, 18 F.3d at 1042 (emphasis added).  Although the 
Supreme Court reversed our conclusion that a formal amendment 
procedure was lacking under section 402(b)(3) of ERISA, the 
Court's decision is consistent with our conclusion that Curtiss-
Wright had expressly reserved the right to amend its plan to 
effect a termination of benefits under the plan, as well as our 
conclusion that "an important and proper purpose of reserving a 
general right to amend is to permit the conditioning or cessation 
of any participant's benefits, not vested by virtue of the 
  
mandate of ERISA, in ways not originally foreseen in order to 
meet unanticipated changes of circumstance."  Id.10   
 We agree with the district court that the fact that the 
Sperry plans used terms such as "lifetime" or "for life" to 
describe the duration of retiree medical benefits, while at the 
same time expressly reserving the company's right to terminate 
the plans under which those benefits were provided, did not 
render the plans "internally inconsistent" and therefore 
ambiguous here.11  An employer who promises lifetime medical 
benefits, while at the same time reserving the right to amend the 
plan under which those benefits were provided, has informed plan 
                     
10
.   In Curtiss-Wright, ___ U.S. ___, 115 S. Ct. 1223 
(1995), the issue of enforcing a reservation of rights clause 
notwithstanding "lifetime" assurances was not before the Supreme 
Court.   
11
.   We do not hold that a reservation of rights will always 
prevail over a promise of benefits.  Due to the abundance of 
ERISA plans and the differing benefits these plans provide, each 
case must be considered fact specific and the court must make its 
determination of the benefits provided based on the language of 
the particular plan it has been called upon to review. 
 
 For instance, in Curtiss-Wright, supra, the district 
court required extrinsic evidence in order to determine that the 
reservation clause in that case "was a general right to amend any 
or all" provisions of the plan.  18 F.3d at 1041, 1042 n.6.  
Thus, we held there that the reservation of rights clause 
overcame or "trumped" the promise of lifetime benefits. 
 
 Thus, Curtiss-Wright contemplated situations in which a 
reservation of rights in the plan documents are ambiguous.  
Where, as here, however, the reservation of rights is broad and 
unequivocal, it will prevail over a promise of lifetime benefits.  
Thus we agree with the district court's conclusion that the 
presence of lifetime language and the reservation of rights 
clauses here did not necessarily render the Sperry retiree 
medical benefit plans ambiguous. 
  
participants of the time period during which they will be 
eligible to receive benefits provided the plan continues to 
exist.  In this case, the Sperry retirees' eligibility for 
benefits was qualified because it was subject to Unisys' reserved 
right to terminate the plan under which those benefits were 
provided.12 
 Other courts have reached the same conclusion, 
recognizing that an employer can qualify the provision of 
"lifetime" benefits by reserving the right to terminate the plan 
under which those benefits are provided.  Thus, in DeGeare v. 
Alpha Portland Indus., Inc., 652 F. Supp. 946 (E.D. Mo. 1986), 
aff'd, 837 F.2d 812 (8th Cir. 1988), vacated and remanded on 
other grounds, 489 U.S. 1049 (1989), the court found that 
seemingly inconsistent provisions, such as those permitting 
modification of the plan and those indicating that benefits last 
for life, must be construed to be harmonious.  The court 
specifically found "harmonious and reasonable the interpretation 
                     
12
.   The Sperry retirees argued that "the Curtiss-Wright 
panel did not consider the specific issue of whether an 
unqualified statement of lifetime benefits can limit the scope of 
a ROR."  They maintain that the promise of lifetime benefits in 
Curtiss-Wright was expressly qualified by the phrase "so long as 
CW maintained a post-retirement health insurance program."  See 
18 F.3d at 1042.  Here they suggest that the promise of lifetime 
benefits were, in contrast, completely unqualified.  See A 2276.  
Thus, the Sperry retirees argue that the Curtiss-Wright case is 
distinguishable from theirs.   
 
 We disagree.  Here, too, the promise made to retirees 
was a qualified one:  the promise that retiree medical benefits 
were for life provided the company chose not to terminate the 
plans, pursuant to clauses which preserved the company's right to 
end them at any time or for any reason.  
  
of [the employer] of the written documents to provide lifetime 
benefits subject to [the employer's] reserved right to amend."  
652 F. Supp. at 961.  See also Anderson v. Alpha Portland Indus., 
Inc., 836 F.2d 1512, 1518 (8th Cir. 1988), cert. denied, 489 U.S. 
1051 (1989) (plaintiffs did not meet their burden of proving 
vested welfare benefits where an employer promised to provide 
welfare benefits "until death of retiree" where the employer had 
expressly reserved the right to terminate or amend the plan); 
Alday v. Container Corp. of America, 906 F.2d 660 (11th Cir. 
1990), cert. denied, 498 U.S. 1026 (1991) (where summary plan 
description also clearly provided that retiree health insurance 
could be terminated or modified, terms of description were 
controlling); Gable v. Sweetheart Cup Co., Inc., 35 F.3d 851, 856 
(4th Cir. 1994), cert. denied, ___ U.S. ___, 115 S.Ct. 1442 
(1995) (company's express reservation of its right to modify or 
terminate the participants' benefits is plainly inconsistent with 
any alleged intent to vest those benefits). 
 Here Sperry, and later Unisys, stated clearly and 
unequivocally in their summary plan descriptions that the company 
reserved the right to "change or end [the plans]" "at any time" 
and for "any . . . reason."  Due to this broad and unambiguous 
language, we hold that the district court did not err when it 
concluded that the Sperry retiree medical benefit plans were not 
internally inconsistent because they contained "lifetime" 
language but also reserved the right to terminate benefits at any 
time.   
 
  
 C. 
 Notwithstanding its legal conclusion based on Curtiss-
Wright that the Sperry plans unambiguously reserved Unisys' right 
to terminate its retiree medical benefit plans, the district 
court analyzed the extrinsic evidence in order to determine 
whether the company intended the reservation of rights to apply 
to the retirees' medical benefits.13  Given the retirees' 
concerns that Curtiss-Wright did not foreclose the inquiry into 
extrinsic evidence, and because a trial had already been held in 
the case, the district court made a factual determination that 
the reservation of rights clause was intended to apply to the 
retirees' medical benefits, as well as a legal determination that 
the retirees had not sustained their burden of proving that the 
employer intended to vest retiree benefits.  
 The district court analyzed, first, the extrinsic 
evidence with respect to the intent of the plan sponsor, Unisys.  
Although the retirees argued that when the company used the term 
"lifetime," its true intent was to vest benefits, the district 
court found that the use of the word "lifetime" did not manifest 
an intent on the part of the plan sponsor to create "vested" 
benefits, because the evidence did not support this argument.  
The district court concluded that because the company had used 
                     
13
.   In Alexander v. Primerica, 967 F.2d at 93, we held that 
where there is an ambiguous ERISA plan, a court may consider, 
inter alia, the intent of the plan's sponsor, the reasonable 
understanding of the beneficiaries, and past practice in 
interpreting the plan.  Accordingly, the district court heard the 
retirees' evidence presented on each of these subjects. 
  
the word "vested" in its medical plan for its top level Sperry 
executives, but not in the rank and file plans, the company must 
have intended not to vest the rank and file benefits.  Rather, as 
the language of the executive plan revealed, when the company 
wanted to create vested benefits, it knew how to do so.14 
 The district court also found that the retirees' 
assertion that the reservation of rights, which did not facially 
distinguish between actives and retirees, applied only to actives 
was not supported by a preponderance of the evidence.  (A 2278-
79).  While the court found that the company had "locked in" 
retirees' benefits in practice in the past, it was "not 
persuaded" that the company had embraced the "active/retiree" 
distinction as a matter of actual policy due to the fact that not 
a single document corroborated the testimony that an 
active/retiree distinction was in force; the distinction was not 
incorporated into the reservation of rights or summary plan 
descriptions or reduced to writing as an official policy.  (A 
2278-80).  The district court found significant the facts that 
the alleged policy of restricting the RORs to active employees 
had never been formally discussed by the Board of Directors, and 
that a board resolution did not exist confirming the creation of 
this policy.  Id.  We agree with the district court that all of 
                     
14
.   The district court further found that the retirees had 
conceded, throughout trial, that an active employee's benefits 
could always be amended or terminated even though lifetime 
language was similarly used to describe that benefit.  This 
concession suggested to the court that the retirees implicitly 
recognized that "lifetime" was not synonymous with "vested."  (A 
2278). 
  
these factors militate against the idea that Unisys intended to 
restrict the application of the RORs to active employees. 
 Numerous retirees testified at trial that they 
understood that their benefits could not be reduced after 
retirement.  Indeed, the district court found that there was "no 
question that the defendant routinely spoke of the medical 
benefits as continuing `for life.'"  (A 2281).  The district 
court specifically found that "this message was conveyed time and 
time again through informal communications that were sent out to 
retirees, and by oral statements that were made to these 
individuals both at private exist interviews and in group 
retirement sessions.  Id.  Nonetheless, the district court 
concluded that the retirees' reasonable understanding of their 
benefits must be limited to the reasonable understanding of the 
summary plan descriptions or plan documents, due to our strong 
precedent which precludes informal amendments to ERISA benefit 
plans.  See, e.g., Hozier v. Midwest Fasteners, Inc., 908 F.2d at 
1164; Haberen v. Kaupp Vascular Surgeons Ltd. Defined Benefit 
Pension Program, 24 F.3d 1491 (3d Cir. 1994) (and cases cited 
therein). 
 Finally, the retirees' submitted evidence of past 
practice which demonstrated that Sperry had never reduced retiree 
medical benefits prior to this litigation.  For example, when the 
Medflex plan was implemented, it applied to future retirees only.  
The retirees argued that this evidence established the existence 
of a policy pursuant to which benefits were "locked-in" upon 
retirement.  The district court found that "merely because the 
  
company had never chosen to exercise its reservations of rights 
prior to this litigation, did not mean that the company had 
waived its right to terminate the plans pursuant to these broad 
and unequivocal reservation of rights clauses."  (A 2283) (citing 
Alexander, 967 F.2d at 93 (rejecting the defendant's argument 
that the company's past practice of changing benefits rendered 
the amendment clause unambiguous); and Howe v. Varity Corp., 896 
F.2d at 1116 ("merely because defendants chose to exempt retirees 
from plan changes in the past does not mean that defendants 
considered themselves forever bound to do so")). 
 Because the record before us firmly supports all of 
these findings, we cannot say that they are clearly erroneous.15  
Therefore, the district court did not err in concluding that the 
reservation of rights applied to the Sperry retirees' medical 
benefits and that the retirees' medical benefits were not 
intended by the company to be vested based upon this evidence.16 
                     
15
.   We do not understand the Sperry retirees to dispute any 
of the findings of fact upon which the district court relied in 
concluding that the alleged policy of applying the reservation of 
rights clause only to active employees was not supported by the 
evidence or the court's conclusion that the retiree medical 
benefits were not vested.  Rather, the retirees dispute the 
inferences from or the weight accorded these findings. 
16
.   We reject the Sperry retirees' argument that the 
district court erred when it analyzed the extrinsic evidence 
because the court gave "too much weight to the subjective 
intentions of some company executives that were not disclosed to 
the employees, while ignoring the uncontradicted evidence of what 
the company said in explaining the plans to its employees, how 
the company applied the plans in practice and what the company 
knew its employees understood the plans to mean."  (Appellants' 
brief at p. 37). 
 
  
 
 III. 
 The Sperry retirees additionally contend that the 
district court erred in failing to sustain the separate contract 
claims of the "early retirees" or "VRIF" ("Voluntary Reduction in 
Force") retirees.  The VRIFs asserted a claim separate from that 
of the regular retirees:  that the company offered them certain 
benefits to induce them to retire which they accepted by retiring 
earlier than they would have.  They contend that this offer and 
their acceptance formed a binding contract, independent of the 
contract rights asserted by the other retirees founded upon the 
basic plans.  See Sprague v. General Motors Corp., 768 F. Supp. 
605 (E.D. Mich. 1991).17 
(..continued) 
 In Taylor v. Continental Group, 933 F.2d 1227, 1233 (3d 
Cir. 1991), we recognized that non-bargained ERISA plans (in that 
case, severance plans) raise special interpretational problems.  
To the extent that the retirees relied on extrinsic evidence of 
"what the company said in explaining the plans to its employees," 
and "how the plans were applied in practice," this evidence 
cannot be used to contradict the unambiguous written terms of an 
ERISA plan.  Reliance on this evidence conflicts with Congress' 
intent that plan documents and SPDs exclusively govern an 
employer's obligations with respect to an ERISA plan.  Thus, the 
district court did not err in its analysis of this extrinsic 
evidence here. 
 
 Further, while the informal statements made by the 
company that the benefits would continue for "life" do not alter 
the contractual analysis, as the district court found, "given the 
consistency and frequency that such communications were made, 
they would appear to support the retirees' other claims, such as 
their BOFD [Breach of Fiduciary Duty] claim."  (A 2282).  See 
appeal No. 94-1875. 
17
.   The district court rejected this claim because the 
court found that the VRIF retirees were in no different position 
with respect to the contract claim than the other retirees:  
 
  
 Although it is true that the VRIFs retired early, 
foregoing future salary and pension accruals in order to secure 
the retiree medical benefits under their existing plans, the 
plans pursuant to which the VRIFs received retiree medical 
benefits contained clear and unequivocal reservation of rights 
clauses that permitted the company to end the plans at any time.  
See, e.g., the 1988 VRIF offering document advising the 
prospective participant of the entitlement to "coverage under the 
Post-Retirement Medical Plan in effect at the time your first 
[pension] check becomes payable."  (A 4395).  Medflex, the plan 
pursuant to which the VRIF retiree medical coverage was to be 
provided, contained an unambiguous reservation of rights 
clause.18  (A 3011).  While the VRIFs point out that the offering 
(..continued) 
   . . . [F]ollowing closing arguments, 
plaintiffs made a belated request in an 
attempt to distinguish a small group of class 
members from the class of Sperry regular 
retirees.  These were individuals who retired 
under a voluntary reduction in force program 
("VRIF"), not a VERIP.  (See Supplemental 
Briefs, filed May 27, 1994.)  The court 
allowed the parties to take some sample 
depositions and to brief the issue, in order 
to discover whether this small group did have 
any "special" claims.  The court, however, 
finds that the VRIF individuals are in no 
different position than any of the other 
Sperry plaintiffs.  Rather, any differences 
that do exist only go to bolster their 
[breach of fiduciary duty] claim.     
 
(A 2264 n. 54).  
18
.   Those employees who retired pursuant to a 1984 VRIF 
were likewise eligible to receive only those medical benefits 
under "the current health insurance plans" whose SPDs contained 
unambiguous RORs.  (A 3029). 
  
materials for their incentive plans promised the incentive 
benefits without any reference to a reserved right by the company 
to amend or terminate the plans, we find that this is not 
dispositive of their claim because the benefits which the VRIFs 
were to receive were described in summary plan descriptions 
containing unambiguous RORs.  Consequently, the district court 
did not err in rejecting the VRIFs' separate bilateral contract 
claim. 
 
 IV. 
 We turn to the retirees' final argument that the 
district court erred in concluding that the estoppel claims of 
all of the regular retirees failed as a matter of law and erred 
in refusing to reconsider its grant of summary judgment on that 
claim.  In re Unisys, 837 F. Supp. 670, 680-81 (E.D. Pa. 1993).   
 An ERISA beneficiary may recover benefits under an 
equitable estoppel theory upon establishing a material 
misrepresentation, reasonable and detrimental reliance upon the 
representation, and extraordinary circumstances.  Curcio v. John 
Hancock Mutual Life Insurance Co., supra, 33 F.3d at 235; Smith 
v. Hartford Ins. Croup, 6 F.3d 131, 137 (3d Cir. 1993).19  The 
retirees contend that they can establish these elements.20   
                     
19
.   We reject Unisys' threshold argument that an estoppel 
claim is not cognizable under ERISA after the Supreme Court's 
decision in Mertens v. Hewitt Assoc., ___ U.S. ___, 113 S. Ct. 
2063 (1993).  We have recently reaffirmed the viability of this 
claim by our decisions in Curcio, supra, and Smith, supra. 
20
.   Regarding the requirement of a material 
misrepresentation, the district court found that the company had 
  
 While we acknowledge that many retirees may have relied 
to their detriment on their interpretation of the summary plan 
descriptions as promising vested or lifetime benefits, we 
nonetheless must reject their estoppel claim.  Due to the 
unambiguous reservation of rights clauses in the summary plan 
descriptions by which Unisys could terminate its retiree medical 
benefit plans, the regular retirees cannot establish "reasonable" 
detrimental reliance based on an interpretation that the SPDs 
promised vested benefits.  The retirees' interpretation of the 
plans as providing lifetime benefits is not reasonable as a 
matter of law because it cannot be reconciled with the 
unqualified reservation of rights clauses in the plans.   
 Our sister courts of appeals have also rejected 
estoppel claims because of the presence of unambiguous 
reservation of rights clauses on the basis that a participant's 
reliance on employer representations regarding benefits may never 
be "reasonable" where the participant is in possession of a 
written document notifying him of the conditional nature of such 
benefits.  See, e.g., Gordon v. Barnes Pumps, Inc., 999 F.2d 133, 
137 (6th Cir. 1993) ("[a]ll plan participants knew or should have 
(..continued) 
misinformed the retirees regarding the duration of their medical 
benefits coverage and that this misrepresentation was material.  
Indeed, the district court found that the company engaged in a 
"systematic campaign of confusion" which led employees to believe 
that their benefits were to continue for life.  The retirees 
contend that the record clearly establishes that many of the 
retirees, including the early retirees or "VRIFs", relied to 
their detriment on the company's misrepresentations because many 
employees accelerated their retirement and gave up salary and 
pension accruals they would have gained if they had continued to 
work. 
  
known from the express terms of the Pullman plan that benefits 
could be altered at any time").  Accord Alday v. Container Corp. 
of America, 906 F.2d 666 (11th Cir. 1990) (promissory estoppel 
did not bar employer from modifying terms of retiree medical 
insurance plans despite participant's claim that employer induced 
him into believing that plan's terms would not change; plan 
unambiguously stated that the employer reserved the right to 
modify or terminate the plan), cert. denied, 498 U.S. 1026 
(1991).  
 While our decisions have not required an express 
finding of plan ambiguity as an element for establishing an 
estoppel claim, we have required that reliance be reasonable.  
Because our decisions require that any detrimental reliance on 
plan language also be "reasonable," our finding that the RORs are 
unambiguous undercuts the reasonableness of any detrimental 
reliance by the retirees.  Accordingly, we hold that the district 
court did not err in concluding, on summary judgment, that the 
retirees' estoppel claim failed as a matter of law. 
 
 V.  
 For the foregoing reasons, we will affirm the judgment 
of the district court. 
 
